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I. The CCCTB concept 
The EU Commission put forward its proposal for a Directive for a "Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base" with some delay after long preliminary work.1 That proposal provides 
for a uniform corporate tax base which may be relied upon in all EU Member States. Its 
underlying objective is to reduce the administrative burden for companies.2 A group which is 
subject to the CCCTB rules will no longer have to determine transfer prices. The concept 
therefore also assumes a consolidated tax base. The CCCTB system is optional and not 
intended to replace the set of corporate tax rules of the Member States. Businesses operating 
in several Member States no longer inevitably encounter different corporate tax systems, but 
are able to opt for one uniform tax base throughout the European Union.3 Still, the proposal 
provides only for a harmonisation of tax bases:  Each Member State will be applying its own 
rates to its share of the taxpayer's tax base. Tax competition will be maintained, but will 
experience a higher degree of regulation and transparency.4 
The CCCTB concept is ambitious. Accordingly, objections and obstacles existed from the 
very beginning: The parliaments of some Member States have issued comments, expressing 
doubts whether the proposal was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in 
EU law.5 Some critics believe that the objective of consolidation simply goes too far: They 
                                                            
1 European Commission of 16 March 2011, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4 [hereinafter: CCCTB proposal]. On the idea and history of 
CCCTB see Aujean, The CCCTB Project and the Future of European Taxation, in 
Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer (eds), Common Consolidated Tax Base (2008) 11 (11 et seq). 
2 See the reasons for the CCCTB proposal, 4 (CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL). 
3 See Art 6 in conjunction with Art 4 CCCTB proposal. See Kubik/Massoner, Der aktuelle Stand der Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Was bisher geschah und noch geschehen wird, FJ 2009, 13 (13 et 
seq.); Petutschnig, Neuer Anlauf zur Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, ÖStZ 2011, 325 (327); 
Riener-Micheler, Gemeinsame konsolidierte Körperschaftsteuerbemessungsgrundlage: Ein Vorschlag der EU, 
CFOaktuell 2011, 95 (95); Förster/Krauß, Der Richtlinienvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission zur 
Gemeinsamen konsolidierten Körperschaftsteuer-Bemessungsgrundlage (GKKB) 16 March 2011, IStR 2011, 
607 (611); on the requirements for forming a group, see Staringer, Requirements for Forming a Group, in 
Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer (eds), Common Consolidated Tax Base (2008) 1115 (115 et seq.). 
4 See the reasons for the CCCTB proposal, 4 (CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL). 
5 See the comments of the parliaments of the nine Member States: Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom, available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/result/simple.do?text=+ccctb+subsidiarity&start= (access on 23 February 2012); see also Vascega/van 
Thiel, The CCCTB proposal: The Next Stop towards a Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union? 
European Taxation 2011, 374 (377); Von Brocke/Rottenmoser, Harmonisierung direkter Steuern? Die GKKB 
im Lichte der Rechtsetzungskompetenzen der EU, IWB 2011, 620 (623); these concerns were invalidated in 
the reasons for the proposal, 10 et seq (LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL), according to which the 
"proposal is limited to combating tax obstacles caused by the disparities of national systems in computing 
the tax base between associated enterprises. [...] that the best results in tackling those obstacles would be 
achieved if a common framework regulated the computation of the corporate tax base and cross-border 
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advocate that the focus should be on a common tax base at least during an initial phase.6 
There were also concerns that companies could either opt for the CCCTB or the national tax 
bases.7 Some Member States even generally rejected a harmonization of direct taxes, 
signalling that they would never agree with a CCCTB Directive that was applicable 
throughout the European Union.8 Many experts hence assume that the CCCTB concept could 
eventually only be a form of "enhanced cooperation" provided by Union law in which not all 
Member States are required to participate.9 
The financial and economic crisis has boosted the discussions on tax harmonization. In a joint 
letter to van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, Merkel and Sarkozy pleaded for 
concluding the negotiations on a common consolidated corporate tax base until the end of 
2012.10 Discussions on EU taxes are increasingly intense, and the Commission itself has 
meanwhile come forward with a proposal for a directive on a financial transaction tax, a tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
consolidation. Indeed, these matters may only be dealt with by laying down legislation at the level of the 
Union, since they are of primarily cross-border nature. This proposal is therefore justified by reference to the 
principle of Subsidiarity because individual action by the Member States would fail to achieve the intended 
results." 
6 See Herzig, Harmonisierung der steuerlichen Gewinnermittlung in der EU; StuW 2006, 156 (161 et seq); Mayr, 
CCCTB: eine realistische Betrachtungsweise, SWI 2008, 288 (289); Füllbier, Überlegungen zum steuerlichen 
Konsolidierungsbegriff und zur Systematisierung von Gruppenbesteuerungssystemen vor dem Hintergrund 
europäischer Entwicklungen, in Strunk/Wassermeyer/Kaminski (eds), Unternehmenssteuerrecht und 
Internationales Steuerrecht - Gedächtnisschrift Dirk Krüger (2006) 211 (222). 
7 Critically: Pomp/Gerten, Die Gemeinsame Körperschaftsteuer-Bemessungsgrundlage: (R)Evolution der 
Konzernbesteuerung? IStR 2008, 377 (392); an optional system was also rejected by the German 
government: Federal government's answer to an inquiry of MPs Dr. Thomas Gambke, Britta Haßelman, Lisa 
Paus, further MPs and Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Gemeinsame konsolidierte Körperschaftsteuer-
Bemessungsgrundlage, 5. 5. 2011, available at: dip.bundestag.de/btd/17/056/1705748.pdf (access on 21 2 
February 2012); disagreeing Barenfeld, A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union 
– A Beauty or a Beast in the Quest for Tax Simplicity, Bulletin for International Taxation 2007, 258 (260). On 
the pros and cons of optionality, see Hey, CCCTB – Optionality, in Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer (eds), 
Common Consolidated Tax Base (2008) 102  et seq. 
8 The United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, critically also Germany: "The Federal 
Government is critical of the proposal in as far as it concerns consolidation and the relevant administrative 
part. As a result of the introduction of a CCCTB, Germany would risk considerable, lasting fiscal deficits", see 
comments of the Federal Government of 5 February 2011, see fn 7. 
9 The principle of unanimity was relaxed by the Treaty of Nice, which provides for the possibility of enhanced 
cooperation ("Enhanced Cooperation Agreements") where at least eight states may cooperate without the 
other states being able to oppose. This facilitates the enforceability of coordination measures on political 
level, the Treaty of Lisbon provides that at least 9 Member States must be involved in cooperation, see Art 
20 EU Treaty and Art 326 through 334 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; seeMamut, Auf 
dem Weg zur Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SWI 2006, 425 (429, Fn 33); similarly 
Mayr, SWI 2008, 288 (288); Cerioni, European Union – Postponement of the Commission’s proposal for a 
CCCTB Directive: Possible Ways Forward, Bulletin for International Taxation 2010, 98 (101 et seq); 
Vascega/van Thiel, European Taxation 2011, 374 (380); Petutschnig, ÖStZ 2011, 325 (333).  
10 Joint German-French letter of 17 August 2011 to the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy; 
see Traversa/Helleputte, Taxation of EU resident companies under the current CCCTB Framework, in 
Lang/Schuch/Staringer et al. (eds), CCCTB (2012) in print. 
4 
that would at least partly directly flow into the EU budget.11 Against this backdrop, it seems 
already less drastic to propose simply a harmonization of the national tax bases. In view of the 
dramatic economic developments in Greece and other EU Member States, critics could more 
willingly accept harmonization in the field of economic and fiscal policy. At the same time, 
the currency union is imperiled now more than ever. Due to erosion processes, also measures 
to create common tax bases could be put off to a time in the distant future.      
For all these reasons, it is extremely uncertain at this point whether, when and in which form 
the forwarded CCCTB proposal will be part of Union law. The fact that a specific proposal 
for a Directive has been available since 2011 has further boosted the discussions. The 
scientific analysis involves not only mere considerations in respect of the concept of such a 
common consolidated corporate tax base, but also concrete proposals for the rules as such. It 
will be up to scholars to review that proposal critically and to point to doubts and weaknesses, 
if any, to pave the ground for an advancement of the proposal. If the competent EU bodies 
should decide to make the CCCTB concept reality, whatever its form may be, they should be 
able to rely on those considerations. 
This paper will focus on some provisions of the proposal, which are relevant for companies 
which are tax resident outside the EU or for commercial activities carried out there, and for 
EU resident companies that operate in third countries. I will primarily discuss the territoriality 
principle, on which the CCCTB concept is based, and its legal technical structure. However, I 
will not discuss other provisions of the proposal, even if those should specifically address 
third country scenarios, such as those concerning deductibility of donations12, the transfer of 
assets13 or deductibility of interest14. 
  
II. Achievement of the territoriality principle 
1. Comprehensive taxation of resident companies 
At least at first sight, the provisions of the CCCTB proposal distinguish between worldwide 
taxation and purely territorial taxation: Pursuant to Art 6 (6) of the proposal "a company 
                                                            
11 European Commission of 28 September 2011, proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of 
financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC , COM(2011) 594. 
12 Art 12 in conjunction with Art 16. 
13 Art 31. 
14 Art 81. 
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resident in a Member State which opts for the system provided for by this Directive shall be 
subject to corporate tax under that system on all income derived from any source, whether 
inside or outside its Member State of residence". Art 6 (7) of the proposal on the other hand 
provides that "a company resident in a third country which opts for the system provided for by 
this Directive shall be subject to corporate tax under that system on all income from an 
activity carried on through a permanent establishment in a Member State". 
The Directive shall hence be applicable to companies resident both inside and outside the EU. 
Art 2 of the proposal distinguishes between "companies established under the laws of a 
Member State" (paragraph 1) and "companies established under the laws of a third country" 
(paragraph 2). The first group is subject to a "list system" primarily known from other fiscal 
Directives.15 A company established under the laws of a Member State is subject to the 
Directive if it takes one of the forms listed in Annex I and is subject to one of the corporate 
taxes listed in Annex II or to a similar tax subsequently introduced. However, Annex II treats 
the companies rather differently. The list of legal forms is exhaustive for some states. In other 
cases, there is a general clause, for example for "other companies constituted under French 
law subject to the French Corporate Tax".16 While the list of companies, albeit different for 
each Member State, eventually seems to be exhaustive, there is a general clause for corporate 
taxes, which provides that not only the corporate taxes listed in Annex II, but also similar 
taxes subsequently introduced are eligible. Such a comparability test is known from Art 2 (4) 
OECD-MC17 or Art 3 (a) (iii) of the Interest and Royalties Directive. 18  While the provisions 
of the OECD-MC and those of the Interest and Royalties Directive are largely consistent, the 
authors of the CCCTB proposal have used an entirely different language in Art 2 (1) (b). This 
is an unsuitable approach, because the objective of those regulations seems to be the same in 
all these cases. A different language will lead to the risk of legal practice inferring a divergent 
content. 
                                                            
15 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in case of 
parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States [hereinafter: Parent-Subsidiary Directive], OJ 
L 345/8, Annex I; Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable 
to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States, OJ L 
157/49, Annex. 
16 Annex I of the CCCTB proposal, k. 
17 Accordingly, the Convention shall apply "also to any identical or substantially similar taxes that are imposed 
after the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes." 
18 Pursuant to Art 3 (a) (iii) of Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation 
applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member 
States: "to one of the following taxes or to a tax which is identical or substantially similar and which is 
imposed after the date of entry into force of this Directive in addition to, or in place of, those existing taxes". 
See now Art 2 (c) (iii) of the proposal of 11 November 2011, COM (2011) 714 final. 
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In addition, Art 2 (3) of the proposal provides that the Commission may adopt delegated acts 
"in order to amend Annexes I and II to take account of changes to the laws of the Member 
States concerning company forms and corporate taxes". Pursuant to Art 127 (1) of the 
proposal, that power to adopt delegated acts shall be conferred on the Commission for an 
indeterminate period of time. Pursuant to Art 128 (1), the delegation of powers may be 
revoked at any time by the Council. Furthermore, pursuant to Art 129 (1), the Council may 
object to a delegated act within a period of three months from the date of notification. If, on 
the expiry of this period, the Council has not objected to the delegated act, it shall be 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union and shall enter into force on the date 
stated therein pursuant to Art 129 (2). The delegated act may be published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union if the Council has informed the Commission of its intention 
not to raise objections. Accordingly, the list of corporate forms referred to in Annex I may be 
extended by way of comitology.19 In case of "a similar tax subsequently introduced", 
however, the adjustment must be made by the Member State itself or, in case of a lack or 
erroneous transposition by the Member State, the common tax base may be applied in direct 
reliance on the Directive. Other than the introduction of newly created corporate forms, the 
introduction of new taxes does not require a comitology procedure to ensure that these are 
covered by the Directive., obviously because Annex I contains a general clause anyway for 
those Member States that consider an automatic adjustment appropriate in case of new 
corporate forms. A similar provision can be found in Art 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
and in Art 3 of the Interest and Royalties Directive. These Directives even provide for a 
similarly differentiated list system for the corporate forms. That system is not subject to 
change by way of comitology, while a comparability test is sufficient in case of corporate 
taxes within the framework of the CCCTB.   
Art 2 (1) of the CCCTB proposal – just like Art 2 (2) – merely requires that the company "is 
subject to" one of the corporate taxes, while Art 2 (1) (c) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
and Art 3 (1) (iii) of the Interest and Royalties Directive requires that the company be subject 
to tax "without being exempt". This implies that the company may be subject to the CCCTB 
rules even if it is exempt.20 Accordingly, we would have to distinguish between companies 
exempt from national corporate tax to which the Directive may be applied, and those 
                                                            
19 See in detail Lyal, Comitology in Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(2008) 49 et seq.; CCCTB Working Group, CCCTB: possible elements of a technical outline, 26 July 2007, 
CCCTB/WP/057/, Items 10, 16, 25, 46 and 66. 
20 Cerioni also applies a broad interpretation in: The Commission’s proposal for a CCCTB Directive: Analysis and 
Comment, Bulletin for International Taxation 2011, 515 (516). 
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companies that are not subject to national corporate tax in the first place and can thus not be 
subject to the scope of application of the Directive. There is little point in terms of legal 
policy to make that distinction, as that approach would make the coincidental national 
legislative techniques relevant for purposes of Union law.21 However, these differences in 
language must not be over-emphasized anyway, since also the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on 
the one hand and the Interest and Royalties Directive on the other hand are different, without 
that fact being material. While Art 2 ( 1) (c) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive emphasizes 
that the company must be subject to one of the taxes stated therein "without the possibility of 
an option", that reference cannot be found in the Interest and Royalties Directive. Still, it 
would be desirable if the authors of the CCCTB proposal followed the wording of provisions 
of an already existing Directive in order to avoid additional problems of interpretation which 
can arise from these very differences.          
Art 6 of the CCCTB proposal substantially distinguishes between companies which are 
resident for tax purposes in a Member State (paragraph 1) and companies which are not 
resident for tax purposes in a Member State (paragraph 2). The first group is entirely subject 
to the Directive if it opts for the system.  When opting for the system, the second group can be 
subject to the provisions of the Directive only in respect of its permanent establishments 
located in the EU. Pursuant to Art 6 (3) of the proposal, a company that has its registered 
office, place of incorporation or place of effective management in a Member State shall be 
considered resident for tax purposes in that Member State. Contrary to Art 2 (a)(ii) of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Art 3 (a) (ii) of the Interest and Royalties Directive, the 
residence criteria must autonomously be derived from Union law22, without any reference to 
national law. The language of Art 6 (3) of the CCCTB proposal in turn rather reminds us of 
Art 4 (1) OECD-MC, although it is not fully identical with it: Art 4 (1) OECD-MC does not 
specifically mention the registered office and merely refers to the place of "management" and 
not to "effective management". The terms "effective management" however can be found in 
the so-called tie-breaker rule of Art 4 (3) OECD-MC. Rather than being similar to Art 4 (1) 
OECD-MC, Art 6 (7) of the CCCTB proposal is similar to Art 4 (1) UN-MC and to Art 4 (1) 
US-MC, both referring to the "place of incorporation". Again, regrettably enough, the authors 
of the proposal have not relied upon already existing expressions.  This might have shed light 
                                                            
21 Cerioni, Bulletin for International Taxation 2011, 517. 
22 See previously Art 2 (1) (b) of Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 on the common system of 
taxation in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ L 7/41; see now 
Art 2 (c) (ii) of the proposal of 11 November 2011, COM (2011) 714 final. 
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upon the meaning of those regulations in reliance on already issued opinions. Instead, they 
have followed their own course.   
Art 6 (3) of the CCCTB proposal lays down an additional criterion to determine a company's 
residence, namely whether it "is not, under the terms of an agreement concluded by that 
Member State with a third country, regarded as tax resident in that third country". If the tie-
breaker rule of a DTC hence makes the third country the country of residence, the company 
will lose its residence in the EU and will be considered a third country entity for tax purposes. 
Based on the DTCs that are modelled after the OECD Model Convention, a company's 
residence is determined by the place of "effective management". There are, however, a 
number of DTCs which deviate from the wording of the OECD-MC or which, in case of dual 
residence, do not grant treaty benefits at all or grant these benefits only after the conduct of 
mutual agreement procedures.23 In these cases, a company will lose its EU-residence only if a 
mutual agreement procedure has been concluded. If a company is not considered resident in 
any state according to a DTC, it cannot be deemed resident in a third country. The same 
applies if there is no DTC with a third country or if the DTC is not applicable. If companies 
resident in two states are hence either not entitled to treaty benefits or are "under observation" 
for purposes of application of a DTC, and the competent authorities therefore reserve the right 
to clarify their entitlement by way of a mutual agreement procedure in a particular case, that 
disadvantage suddenly becomes a blessing for the purpose of the Directive. In terms of legal 
policy, that diametric difference in evaluation between DTC and proposal is not 
comprehensible at first sight. 
Concededly, Art 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Art 3 of the Interest and Royalties 
Directive are based on a similar concept,24 although the CCCTB proposal has its own 
terminology. As a result of the two existing Directives, the absence of treaty benefits turns 
into an advantage for purposes of the Directive. Ultimately, the Directive's scope of 
application depends on the content of the concluded DTCs and can hence be different in each 
Member State. This can only be due to the fact that, as a result of the company's residence 
outside the EU for purposes of the DTC, the company can be taxed in the EU Member State 
only in respect of income from sources in the Member State, hence resembling more a non-
                                                            
23 See for the first example the DTC Austria-Liechtenstein. For the second example DTC Bulgaria-Latvia, 
Bulgaria-Lithuania, Estonia-Finland, Estonia-Canada, Estonia-Latvia, Estonia-Lithuania, Estonia-Turkey, 
Estonia-Belarus, Finland-Canada, Finland-Latvia, Finland-Lithuania, Finland-Turkey, Finland-Belarus, Canada-
Mexico, Canada-Philippines, Canada-Thailand, Latvia-Canada, Latvia-Turkey, Latvia-Belarus, Lithuania-
Canada, Lithuania-Turkey, Lithuania-Belarus, Thailand-Turkey. 
24 See now Art 2 of the proposal of 11 November 2011, COM (2011) 714 final.  
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resident than a resident. For the existing Directives and also for the CCCTB proposal, the 
question now is whether it is worth to accept for that objective the fact that the scope of the 
Directive varies from Member State to Member State and, on the other hand, depends on in 
which third country the company is still resident. Should these companies generally be 
regarded as being resident in the EU, it would be useful to adopt in the Directive the wording 
of the tie-breaker rule laid down in Art 4 (3) OECD-MC. In that case, however, companies 
taxable in respect of their world-wide income would sometimes be considered non-residents 
also in the EU for purposes of the CCCTB rules. Pursuant to Art (4) of the CCCTB proposal, 
companies resident in several Member States would be subject to precisely that rule in order 
to determine in which Member State they are finally resident. 
Art 6 (6) CCCTB proposal provides that a company resident in a Member State which opts 
for the system provided for by this Directive "shall be subject to corporate tax under that 
system on all income derived from any source, whether inside or outside its Member State of 
residence". Similarly, Art 6 (7) provides in respect of a company resident in a third country 
that it "shall be subject to corporate tax under that system on all income from an activity 
carried on through a permanent establishment in a Member State". This language hence 
implies that the concept of income is very broad, because the focus is on "all" and – at least in 
Art 6 (6) – "from any source, whether inside or outside its Member State of residence". 
Art 10 CCCTB proposal provides that the tax base shall be calculated as revenues minus 
exempt revenues, deductible expenses and other deductible items. Revenues, in turn, are 
defined in Art 4 (8) of the proposal. Revenues hence include also "subsidies and grants, gifts 
received, compensation and ex-gratia payments". The second sentence of Art 4 (8) of the 
proposal specifically notes that revenues shall not include equity raised by the taxpayer or 
debt repaid to it. "Income" can be defined also on the basis of other provisions: Art 9 (1) of 
the proposal provides that in computing the tax base, profits and losses "shall be recognized 
only when realized". The concept of income is hence determined also by the realization 
principle. Pure appreciation of assets will hence not trigger taxable income. Exemptions from 
the realization principle - such as the provisions for controlled foreign companies pursuant to 
Art 82 of the CCCTB proposal - are specifically mentioned. Further indications are offered by 
the exemptions. Art 11 (d) specifically exempts proceeds from a disposal of shares. This 
implies that capital gains otherwise qualify as income. 
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2. Exemption of foreign permanent establishments, dividends, and capital gains 
The provision of Art 11 (e) CCCTB proposal largely realises the territoriality principle. It 
exempts from corporate tax "income of a permanent establishment in a third country". At the 
same time, Art 11 (c) exempts received profit distributions and Art 11 (d) exempts proceeds 
from a disposal of shares. Other than the exemption of permanent establishments in third 
countries, both provisions apply regardless of the residence of the entity which distributes 
profits or whose shares are disposed of. It hence makes no difference whether an EU-resident 
company operates in a third country through a permanent establishment or through shares in 
another company. This provision is characterized by the principle of neutrality as to corporate 
form. Both profits of permanent establishments and the profit distributions of the companies 
are exempt. In both cases, also the capital gains are exempt.  
However, in other cases, income from third countries may be subject to tax, for example if it 
is not "income of a permanent establishment". If a taxpayer engages in commercial activities 
in a third country without establishing a fixed place of business, he will therefore still be taxed 
on his worldwide income. Furthermore, the principle of attraction does not apply either. 
Consequently, not the mere existence of a permanent establishment in another state will lead 
to an exemption of all income generated in this state. As the proposal only exempts "income 
of a permanent establishment" the income has to be attributable to the permanent 
establishment. 
The concept of permanent establishment is defined in detail in Art 5 of the proposal. That 
definition is largely modelled after Art 5 OECD-MC. The authors of the proposal hence have 
decided to follow neither the model of Art 3 (c) of the Interest and Royalties Directive, which 
merely defines permanent establishments along the lines of Art 5 (1) OECD-MC25, nor Art 2 
(b) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive which combines this brief definition of a permanent 
establishment with a subject-to-tax-clause. Again, the proposal did not fully adopt Art 5 
OECD-MC. Consequently, the meaning of the expression which is missing in the OECD 
Model, according to which the permanent establishment of a taxpayer must be "in a State 
other than the State in which its central management and control is located", remains unclear. 
There is no apparent reason for this derogation from Art 5 OECD-MC. Not only does this 
addition seem superfluous, it also raises doubts as will be shown below.  
                                                            
25 See Art 2 (e) of the proposal of 11 November 2011, COM (2011) 714 final.  
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The proposal does not contain any provision which specifically refers to the allocation of 
profits. Since numerous provisions are parallel to those of the OECD-Model– such as those 
regarding permanent establishments - obviously, the principles relevant in connection with 
Art 7 OECD-MC could apply.26 However, specifically the question of allocating profits to 
permanent establishments is not one for which there is a definite answer within the OECD: 
Art 7 OECD-MA was thoroughly restated by the Update 2010.27 In the context of Union law, 
however, the question arises whether the allocation of profits to a permanent establishment 
should not be governed by those principles that are enshrined in the EU Arbitration 
Convention.28 Art 4 (2) of the EU Arbitration Convention provides as follows: "Where an 
enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in another Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein, there shall be attributed to that permanent 
establishment the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate 
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and 
dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment." 
This rule is visibly modelled after the former Art 7 (2) OECD-MC,29 although the latter did 
not contain the reservation in respect of the special provisions of Art 7 (3) OECD-MC and Art 
7 (3) OECD-MC, just like paragraphs (4) and (5) of Art 7 OECD-MC, is not reflected in the 
EU Arbitration Convention. Provided that the principles enshrined in the EU Arbitration 
Convention adopted in 1990 are considered relevant, it seems reasonable to allocate profits on 
the basis of the opinions adopted in the OECD-MC and the 1977 OECD Commentary. 
Already the bilateral DTCs do not provide any basis for the OECD Commentary's opinion 
that the current version of the OECD Commentary should be relied upon for an interpretation 
of DTCs concluded even earlier.30 That position has to be even less relevant for an 
interpretation of the EU Arbitration Convention. That opinion, known as Authorized-OECD-
                                                            
26 CCCTB Working Group, An overview of the main issues that emerged at the third meeting of the subgroup on 
International aspects (SG4), 13 December 2006, CCCTB/WP/049/, Sections 13 et seq. 
27 On the implementation of the AOA in Art 7 of the OECD-MC 2010, see Plansky, Die Gewinnzurechnung zu 
Betriebsstätten im Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2010) 248 et seq; see also Bendlinger, 
Paradigmenwechsel bei der Auslegung des Betriebsstättenbegriffs im DBA-Recht durch die OECD, SWI 2006, 
358 (358 et seq); Bendlinger, Die Betriebsstätte im OECD-Musterabkommen 2010, SWI 2011, 61 (61 et seq). 
28 Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated 
enterprises; original version of 23 July 1990 (90/436/EEC). 
29 See Art 7 (2) OECD-MC 2008. 
30 See Lang, Die Bedeutung des Musterabkommens und des Kommentars des OECD-Steuerausschusses für die 
Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, in Gassner/Lang/Lechner (eds), Aktuelle Entwicklungen im 
Internationalen Steuerrecht (1994) 13 (25); Lang, Keine Bedeutung der jüngeren Fassung des Kommentars 
des OECD-Steuerausschusses für die Interpretation älterer Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, IWB 1996, 923 
et seq; Lang, Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation Conventions (2010) 45 et seq. 
12 
Approach (AOA), could prevail only if it can be inferred from the principles already 
enshrined in the 1977 OECD-MC and the Commentary. 
However, the provisions of Articles 78 and 79 of the CCCTB proposal should be taken into 
account. Although concerning only associated enterprises and, at least at first sight, not the 
relations between headquarters and permanent establishment, the last subparagraph of Art 78 
(1) provides that a taxpayer "shall be regarded as an associated enterprise to its permanent 
establishment in a third country", and similarly a non-resident taxpayer "shall be regarded as 
an associated enterprise to its permanent establishment in a Member State". This implies that 
the relations between headquarters and permanent establishments are governed by the 
provisions on relations between associated companies laid down in Art 78, although that is 
not absolutely certain. Art 79 governs "relations between associated enterprises" and hence 
presupposes at least the existence of two associated companies, while the last subparagraph of 
Art 78 (1) regards the taxpayer as an "associated enterprise to its permanent establishment", 
hence does not stipulate that both the taxpayer and its permanent establishment must each be 
considered as "associated" companies. Once these concerns are overridden, the legal 
consequences laid down in Art 78 (f) of the proposal are relevant also for the relations 
between headquarters and permanent establishment. However, Art 79 is somehow - albeit not 
fully - modelled after Art 9 OECD-MC and Art 4 (1) of the EU Arbitration Convention.31 
This could be a reason to grant the permanent establishment greater independence from its 
headquarters in the context of attributing its profits than this would be possible pursuant to Art 
4 (2) of the EU Arbitration Agreement.  Against this backdrop, the provisions of the proposal 
could also be inspired by the fundamental idea of the Authorized OECD Approach.           
Furthermore, Art 11 (e) of the CCCTB proposal can also lead to an exemption of income from 
sources within the EU. That exemption applies also if a permanent establishment's income in 
a third country includes also interest or royalties from the EU. If the assets of a US-based 
permanent establishment of a German company include, inter alia, French bonds and interest 
is attributable to that permanent establishment, also French interest is exempt.  
Revenues which are specifically exempt pursuant to Art 11 (c) of the CCCTB proposal 
include also "received profit distributions". The proposal apparently wants to avoid economic 
double taxation of profits by exempting the profit distributions as such. The proposal 
obviously wants to leave it at the fact that the lower-level entity is regularly taxable, its tax 
                                                            
31 CCCTB Working Group, Related parties in CCCTB, 13 December 2006, CCCTB/WP/041/, Sections 13 et seq. 
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base being determined according to national law or the CCCTB Directive. The recipient entity 
should not be taxable again. There is no minimum holding period or minimum shareholding 
requirement. This provision does not differentiate by residence of the distributing company 
and is hence also applicable to "received profit distributions" from third countries. Again, the 
language the authors of the proposal have selected is not fully consistent with the language of 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. While the Parent-Subsidiary Directive refers to "distributions 
of profits", the CCCTB proposal refers to "received profit distributions". One explanation 
could be that the exemption can thereby be distinguished from the tax liability of certain 
"non-distributed income of an entity" expressed as an exception in Art 82 (1) in conjunction 
with Art 83 (5).  
The exemption of "received profit distributions" does not define the legal nature of the 
participation which establishes the right to receive profit distributions. It is therefore uncertain 
whether corporate law is relevant here or whether a mere obligation is sufficient, provided a 
corresponding share is held in equity. Similarly, the specific requirements which an entity has 
to fulfill to qualify as a source of "distributions of profits" are not defined.  
Some indications for a definition of "distributions of profits" could be found in Art 82 (1) (a) 
of the proposal: The provisions for "controlled foreign companies" are supposed to subject to 
direct taxation income received by the foreign entity at the level of the shareholder or persons 
with a similarly controlling position. These provisions shall apply if the taxpayer by itself, or 
together with its associated enterprises, holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 
50% of the voting rights, or owns more than 50% of the capital or is entitled to receive more 
than 50% of the profits of that entity. Supposedly, taxpayers could also receive distributions 
of profits if they either have voting rights or hold capital or are entitled to profits. However, 
pursuant to Art 83 (2) of the proposal, the income to be included in the tax base "shall be 
calculated in proportion to the entitlement of the taxpayer to share in the profits of the foreign 
entity". This, in turn, implies that only an entity that is entitled to the profits can have a 
"received profit distribution".     
Another approach could be based on the definition of dividends. Although the CCCTB 
proposal does not contain such a definition, its Art 81 (2) specifies interest in conformity with 
Art 11 (3) OECD-MC, which has also been adopted in the Interest and Royalties Directive.32 
                                                            
32 Lang, Hybride Finanzierungen im internationalen Steuerrecht (1990) 114 et seq; Nowotny, VwGH zum 
abkommensrechtlichen Begriff der Einkünfte aus Zinsen iSv Art 11 Abs 3 OECD-MA, ÖStZ 2004, 137 (137 et 
seq); CCCTB Working Group, 23 September 2005, CCCTB/WP/017, Section 15; Andersson, Comments on 
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Impliedly, the authors of the proposal could have understood dividends pursuant to Art 10 (3) 
OECD-MC. Again, it is an entirely different question whether "received profit distributions" 
could be clarified based on that understanding. In connection with revenues, Art 4 (8) of the 
proposal refers inter alia to "proceeds from disposal of assets and rights, interest, dividends 
and other profit distributions", that rather suggesting that profit distributions must be 
understood much broader than dividends. Paragraph 11 of the Directive's recitals, on the other 
hand, assumes that "income consisting in dividends, the proceeds from the disposal of shares 
held in a company outside the group and the profits of foreign permanent establishments 
should be exempt". Quite obviously, the authors of the proposal had in mind the exemptions 
of Art 11 (c), (d) and (e), which include "received profit distributions", "proceeds from a 
disposal of shares" and "income of a permanent establishment in a third country". This 
clearly shows that the expressions "income consisting in dividends" and "received profit 
distributions" were used synonymously in this context. 
Furthermore, Art 11 (d) of the proposal exempts proceeds from a disposal of shares, 
regardless ofholding period and extent of the shareholding. In terms of terminology, that 
provision does not build on the previously discussed exemption of "received profit 
distributions". Due to the systematic context, it is presumably a requirement that the entity in 
which a share is held and which is exempt in respect of "received profit distributions" is the 
same form of entity. The CCCTB rules are hence broader than the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, which merely necessitates the exemption of profit distributions. This is a consistent 
systematic approach, since a shareholder frequently faces the option of realizing the profits 
generated by his entity either in the form of profit distributions or in the form of capital gains. 
For all these cases, Art 72 provides that for determining the tax rate applicable to a taxpayer, 
without prejudice to Article 75, revenue which is exempt from taxation pursuant to Art 11 (c), 
(d) or (e) may be taken into account. That exemption with progression will be of little 
relevance whenever the rate of corporate tax is flat. The exemption with progression rules 
could be significant whenever different tax categories or different rates are applicable to 
distributed and retained profits. Interestingly enough in this context, this provision refers to 
"revenue" while the proposal uses the terms "proceeds" or "income" elsewhere. This could be 
significant in respect of a possible negative exemption by progression. The fact that this 
provision mentions only revenue and hence a positive gross amount, could imply that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
document CCCTB\WP\042 (2006) 1 et seq.; Art 11 (4); Wassermeyer in Wassermeyer/Lang/Schuch(2010), 
Doppelbesteuerung - OECD-Musterabkommen DBA Österreich - Deutschland, Kommentar2 , MA Art 11 para 
71. 
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CCCTB should not allow a negative exemption with progression. Based on the assumption 
that revenue is a gross figure, the expenses attributable to third-country income could not be 
taken into account. This would hardly make sense in terms of legal policy, as this would not 
lead to an exemption of foreign income in cases of high related expenses. 
  
3. Taxation of EU permanent establishments and third-country residents 
Companies resident in third countries may also be subject to the CCCTB in respect of their 
EU-based permanent establishments. In determining the tax base, the profits attributable to 
the permanent establishment will be included.33 The non-resident then forms a group together 
with that permanent establishment and the other qualified subsidiaries.  
Pursuant to Art 2 of the proposal, the proposed Directive shall apply to a company established 
under the laws of a third country if it has a similar form to one of the forms listed in Annex I 
and if it is subject to one of the corporate taxes listed in Annex II. A similarity test must hence 
be carried out in respect of companies established under the laws of a third country. That 
provision hence differs from that applicable to EU-resident companies, although it does not 
specify the relevant parameters needed to make a comparison. Presumably, that comparison 
shall not involve the corporate forms accepted in the specific Member State, as third countries 
should not be qualified differently in each Member State. Still, the common features of the 
corporate forms listed in Annex I are not evident. That similarity test is even more 
complicated by the fact that the list of Annex I may be supplemented by way of a comitology 
procedure, with no similarity test being necessary, obviously leaving broader scope for 
discretion: The Commission is supposed "to take account of changes to the laws […]". This 
gives also the similarity test a dynamic element, and it may be different depending on the 
status of Annex I.    
Interestingly enough, other than for companies established in the EU, no similarity test is 
necessary in respect of corporate tax; the company must rather be subject to one of the 
corporate taxes listed in Annex II. I presume that this is an editorial error, since it is hard to 
see why companies that are subject to a similar tax introduced later on in respect of their EU 
permanent establishments should not automatically be covered by the Directive in that case. 
                                                            
33  CCCTB Working Group, The territorial scope of the CCCTB, 9 March 2006, CCCTB/WP/026/, Section 30. 
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In view of the non-discrimination of permanent establishments enshrined in existing DTCs 
with third countries, that discrimination could raise concerns. 
Pursuant to Art 3 (1) of the proposal, the Commission shall adopt annually a list of third 
country company forms. That list shall meet the requirements laid down in Art 2 (2) (a) of the 
proposal and shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure provided therein. 
In that case, a simplified authorization procedure applies: Pursuant to Art 5 of Regulation No 
182/201134, the committee shall deliver its opinion by the majority laid down in Art 16 (4) 
and (5) of the Treaty on European Union and, where applicable, Art 238 (3) TFEU, for acts to 
be adopted on a proposal from the Commission. Where the committee delivers a positive 
opinion, the Commission shall adopt the draft implementing act. 
However, the corporate forms are not listed exhaustively. Nevertheless, the fact that a 
company form is not included in the list of third country company forms referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall not preclude the application of this Directive to that form. This makes sense, 
because the Commission cannot always keep track of all changes in legislation worldwide. In 
this context, however, the question arises whether national legislators must implement that 
provision in a manner to allow administrative authorities and, eventually, the courts to carry 
out an examination procedure, or whether the national legislator itself is required to carry out 
an examination procedure and make continuous adjustments. Since the national legislator, just 
like the Commission, cannot always keep track of all changes in legislation worldwide, the 
national legislator might content itself with ordering an examination procedure by way of a 
general clause, which shall then be handled pursuant to the list prepared by the Commission 
according to Art 3 (2). The company forms referred to in that list must be regarded as similar 
in any case, although the fact that a company form is not included in the list does not preclude 
the application of this Directive to that form.   
In view of the tax base, Art 6 (7) of the proposal combines territorial taxation with world-wide 
taxation of income: A company resident in a third country is subject to tax only on income 
from an activity carried on through a permanent establishment in a Member State. This means 
that a permanent establishment must exist and that income must be attributable to the 
permanent establishment. On the other hand, income from that activity is taxable whether the 
activity concerns only the state of the permanent establishment or another EU Member State 
                                                            
34 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down 
the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's 
exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55/13. 
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or even a third country: Consequently, if a US-resident company has a permanent 
establishment in the EU to which interest from the US is attributable, that permanent 
establishment is taxable under the CCCTB regime. 
Pursuant to Art 6 (2) of the proposal, a company which is not resident for tax purposes in a 
Member State may opt for the system provided for by this Directive under the conditions laid 
down therein in respect of a permanent establishment maintained by it in a Member State. 
Whether or not a permanent establishment exists again depends on the definition set forth in 
Art 5 of the proposal. As discussed above, that definition is largely modelled after the OECD 
Model Convention. 
As a consequence, the question arises whether the numerous exemptions discussed above are 
applicable to non-resident companies as well. This would be the case under Union law only if 
the freedom of establishment applied. Besides situations involving EEA states, this could only 
refer to situations within the European Union. Arguably, the free movement of capital will not 
necessitate an extension of these exemptions to permanent establishments in relation to other 
third countries. However, this may be necessary since DTCs with third countries contain 
provisions which prohibit discrimination of permanent establishments. 
The wording of the relevant exemptions as such is regularly not confined to resident 
companies. Art 11 of the proposal does not contain such a restriction at all: That provision 
generally exempts from corporate tax the proceeds mentioned therein without distinguishing 
as to whether these are earned by an EU resident or non-EU resident. Accordingly, the 
exemptions laid down in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e) are applicable as well. 
Consequently, if the dividends are attributed to the permanent establishment according to any 
of the principles discussed above, profit distributions are also exempt at the level of the 
permanent establishment. The same applies to proceeds from a disposal of shares which are 
part of the business assets of that permanent establishment. 
The exemption of a permanent establishment's income in a third country could be relevant as 
well. Let me use a construction company as an example to illustrate this: If a construction 
company resident in a third country has a permanent establishment in an EU state and carries 
out from that state a building site in a third country, that building site qualifies as a permanent 
establishment pursuant to Art 5 of the proposal if it lasts longer than twelve months. If that is 
the case, the building site profits cannot be taxed at the level of the permanent establishment 
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in the EU Member State35. Although one could argue that it is not a permanent establishment 
of a taxpayer which is located in a state other than the state in which the taxpayer’s central 
management and control is located, we should nevertheless not overemphasize that 
inadequacy of Art 5 of the proposal. Otherwise, the results would be different if the state of 
residence of the company is a third country other than the country in which the building site is 
carried out. It would be inappropriate to arrive at different results here. 
Another question is whether the exemption with progression referred to in Art 72 of the 
CCCTB proposal would be applicable in these and other situations. Again, that provision 
certainly does not specifically refer to EU resident taxpayers. There is hence no obstacle to 
applying the exemption with progression clause here as well. For systematic reasons, there are 
frequent calls also in the field of of national tax systems for an application of the exemption 
with progression also in the state of limited tax liability to avoid inappropriate preferred 
treatment as a result of the exemption method.36 Against this backdrop, nothing speaks against 
applying Art 72 in this situation. 
 
III. Derogation to the principle of territoriality 
1. Taxation of interest and royalties 
The CCCTB concept is characterized by the principle of territoriality. The authors of the 
proposal have initially assumed a comprehensive concept of income which is not confined to 
EU sources and have then restricted that taxation of worldwide income through the 
exemptions discussed above. As a consequence, however, any income is taxable which is 
subject to that concept and not exempt. Business profits generated outside the EU which are 
not attributable to a permanent establishment located outside the EU are therefore taxable 
pursuant to the CCCTB rules. 
                                                            
35 On the DTC problems of "sub permanent establishment" see Buciek "Unterbetriebsstätte" und 
Außensteuerrecht, in Klein/Stihl/Wassermeyer/Piltz/Schaumburg (eds), Unternehmen, Steuern - Festschrift 
Flick (1997) 647 (647 et seq); Gassner/Hofbauer, Die Unterbetriebstätte, in 
Gassner/Lang/Lechner/Schuch/Staringer (eds), Die beschränkte Steuerpflicht im Einkommen- und 
Körperschaftsteuerrecht (2004) 83 (85 et seq); Lang, Die Unterbetriebstätte im Abkommensrecht, in 
Gocke/Gosch/Lang (eds), Körperschaftsteuer, Internationales Steuerrecht, Doppelbesteuerung - Festschrift 
Wassermeyer (2005) 709 (715 et seq). 
36 Haunold/Tumpel/Widhalm, EuGH: Negativer Progressionsvorbehalt bei beschränkter Steuerpflicht geboten, 
SWI 2007, 486 (486 et seq); Marschner, Die Steuerpflicht nach § 1 Abs. 4 EStG und das Gemeinschaftsrecht, 
SWK 2007, S 692 (692 et seq).  
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The same applies to other non-exempt income, in particular interest and royalties. The authors 
of the proposal have emphasized the taxable nature of that income by having incorporated in 
Art 76 a credit for foreign taxes. This provision requires income to be included in the tax base 
and being taxable in the EU.  
2. The switch-over clause 
Under certain circumstances, a switch-over from the exemption method to the credit method 
is possible in respect of the exemptions referred to in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e). This witch-over 
is possible if the company which made the profit distributions, the entity the shares of which 
are disposed of or the permanent establishment were subject to tax at a rate which was too low 
in the country of residence of the company.37 This fact will revive the tax liability, while the 
exemptions referred to in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e) are eliminated with the aim of avoiding 
double non-taxation or taxation under the general regime in a country.  
The switch-over pursuant to Art 73 shall apply if "under the general regime in that third 
country" the entity which made the profit distributions, the entity the shares in which are 
disposed of or the permanent establishment were subject, in the entity's country of residence 
or the country in which the permanent establishment is situated is subject to "a tax on profits 
at a statutory corporate tax rate lower than 40% of the average statutory corporate tax rate 
applicable in Member States". Alternatively, that provision shall apply if the company or the 
permanent establishment is subject to "a special regime in that third country that allows for a 
substantially lower level of taxation than the general regime". 
The first provision of Art 73 (a) of the proposal merely asks if the taxpayer is subject to "a tax 
on profits, under the general regime in that third country, at a statutory corporate tax rate 
lower than 40% of the average statutory corporate tax rate". Relevant is only the nominal tax 
rate and not the taxpayer's specific tax burden. The switch-over occurs in any event if the 
nominal tax rate is lower than this threshold. The switch-over applies even if the tax burden is 
high due to broad tax bases with only few exceptions, and even if it is higher than in the 
controlling shareholder's Member State.  
Let me give you an example: A company resident in a Member State has a permanent 
establishment in a third country which generates profits of 100,000 determined according to 
CCCTB rules. Due to other tax base rules in that state, the permanent establishment's profit 
                                                            
37 CCCTB Working Group, Possible elements of a technical outline, 26 July 2007, CCCTB/WP/057, Section 120. 
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amounts to 500,000 according to the domestic law of the third country. At a nominal tax rate 
of 8%, the corporate tax burden is hence 40,000. The switch-over clause applies although the 
actual tax burden in the other state - in relation to the CCCTB tax base - is 40%.      
On the other hand, Art 73 (a) does not apply if the nominal tax rate exceeds the threshold, but 
if the effective tax burden is low or even zero due to the tax base provisions. In that case, the 
switch-over could take place only if the requirements of Art 73 (b) are fulfilled. For purposes 
of Art 73 (a) the question arises whether there can be several "general regimes", for example 
if different tax rates apply to different types of corporate forms or if different tax rates apply 
to profit distributions and retained profits. Art 73 (b) of the CCCTB proposal seems to 
preclude that, as it refers to "the general regime". In those cases, it can be rather difficult to 
identify a single "general regime".  
The alternative requirement of Art 73 (b) applies only if the taxpayer is subject to "a special 
regime in that third country that allows for a substantially lower level of taxation than the 
general regime". Again, let me give you an example: The corporate tax rate is generally 40% 
in the third country. A company may take advantage of a 20% special tax rate due to the fact 
that the permanent establishment is located in an area of the third country for which tax 
subsidies are granted. This "allows for a substantially lower level of taxation than the general 
regime". Art 73 (b) also requires this tax rate to be "substantially" lower than the general 
regime. There is no identifiable standard to measure substantiality. Let us assume that a tax 
rate which is 20% lower than the general regime qualifies as substantially lower rate. This 
example shows that a 20% special tax rate may trigger a switch-over, while a 15% regular tax 
rate will regularly not do so as long as the average applicable statutory corporate tax rate is 
lower than 15%.    
Other than paragraph a, paragraph b of Art 73 does not refer to the "statutory corporate tax 
rate applicable in the Member States", but only to the "level of taxation", apparently not 
referring to the nominal tax rate, but simply comparing the tax rate under the general regime 
with that which the special regime "allows for". Consequently, special provisions concerning 
the tax base should presumably fall under this provision. Let me give you an example: The 
corporate tax rate is generally 40% in the third country. Since the company's permanent 
establishment is located in an area of the third country for which tax subsidies are granted, the 
company may recognize special depreciation. Its profit therefore amounts to 500,000. Profits 
would have amounted to 1,000,000 without that special depreciation. The tax burden would 
have amounted to 400,000 at a 40% tax rate, but only 200,000 of tax are payable under the 
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special regime. The taxpayer reduced its tax burden to 20% in relation to the general regime. 
The requirements for the application of Art 73 (b) are fulfilled38.  
Some of these examples show that the provision can also apply in cases where there is no 
need for it in terms of legal policy. Particularly Art 73 (b) of the proposal leads to unjustified 
differentiation. If the tax rate under the general regime and the tax rate allowed for under a 
special regime do not amount to 40% and 20% respectively, but to 11% and 9%, the latter will 
presumably not be regarded as substantially lower as required under Art 73 (b). If the average 
rate of taxation relevant under Art 73 (a) is 10%, it will hence not trigger a switch-over, 
although the tax rate under the special regime is lower. Furthermore, a third country which 
disguises its benefits as general regimes and provides for a nominally higher tax rate can 
allow the resident companies or permanent establishments to escape the provision of Art 73. 
These differentiations are undoubtedly dubious.  
The legal uncertainty which this regime creates is however alarming: The applicable average 
corporate tax rate pursuant to Art 73 (a) of the proposal is easily determinable and will be 
notified by the Commission in advance. However, the proposal does not clearly define a 
standard based on which the "substantiality" Art 73 (b) calls for must be determined. The 
40% threshold defined by Art 73 (a) can at best be an indication, yet in a different context. If 
one nevertheless relied upon that threshold, the above examples involving a 20% tax rate 
under a special regime would not be substantially lower and therefore not trigger the 
applicability of Art 73 (b): The 20% would merely represent 50% of the regular tax rate.  
It can be just as difficult in a particular case to identify a "special regime". Which provisions 
qualify as "special regimes" will probably have to be determined in comparison with the 
"general regime". On the other hand, the CCCTB regime will have to be the standard. 
Exemptions available in the third country for capital gains, profit distributions or profits 
generated by permanent establishments in other third countries will presumably not be special 
regimes.  
Although Art 73 of the proposal is titled "Switch-over clause", the clause as such merely 
provides for an exception from the exemptions referred to in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e) and 
triggers a revival of the tax liability in respect of that income. The clause does not provide for 
                                                            
38 According to the German wording of Art 73 (b), a switch-over would also occur under “a special regime” 
(“Sonderregelung"), if it were applicable in a Member State: While Art 73 (a) refers to “in that third country” 
("betreffenden Drittland") this requirement is missing in Art 73 (b) of the German version. The English 
version, however, clarifies that also Art 73 (b) is applicable only to a special regime "in that third country". 
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a credit as such. Still, Art 74 gives that impression: "Where Article 73 applies to the income of 
a permanent establishment in a third country, its revenues, expenses and other deductible 
items shall be determined according to the rules of the system provided for by this Directive." 
This provision would make sense only if the permanent establishment's income were to be 
taken into account for the CCCTB tax base for purpose of the credit method and specifically 
the calculation of the maximum credit. However, neither Art 73 nor Art 74 of the proposal 
provides for an obligation to credit.   
A credit obligation can however be derived from Art 76 of the proposal. If income has already 
been taxed in another Member State or in a third country, the foreign tax can be credited 
under that provision, except in respect of income that is exempt pursuant to Art 11 (c), (d) or 
(e). The text of these provisions hence does not mention as requirements the terms "interest" 
and "royalties" which are mentioned in the title. The underlying objective is to credit foreign 
tax in order to eliminate double taxation in all cases in which it is not eliminated by way of 
exemption.  
In the absence of other available provisions, Art 76 of the proposal can be relied upon as basis 
for the credit obligation connected with the switch-over. Its wording so permits, because it 
refers to "income which has been taxed […] in a third country" and exempts only "income 
which is exempt under Article 11 (c), (d) or (e)". The exemption pursuant to Art 11 (c), (d) 
and (e) does not apply, because it is precluded by Art 73. 
It is questionable whether the scope of application of Art 76 is so broad to procure also an 
indirect credit of corporate tax imposed upon the third country entity in the cases in which 
Art 73 of the proposal denies an exemption for "received profit distributions". Such an 
indirect credit is necessary if the switch-over is supposed to eliminate double taxation just like 
the exemption provided in Art 11 (c). The Parent-Subsidiary Directive maps out that option as 
an alternative to an exemption.39 Although express provisions for the calculation of the prior 
tax burden in the third country do not exist, that is certainly permissible according to the 
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wording of Art 76. Art 76 (5) of the proposal merely refers to "deduction for the tax liability 
in a third country". The provision does not specify whose tax liability in the third country that 
is. Based on that wording, those cases would allow both a direct and an indirect credit. It does 
not expressly regulate the criteria according to which the corporate tax of the distributing 
company, to which the distribution is attributable, shall be determined.  
Whoever considers it necessary that "received profit distributions" be credited indirectly 
pursuant to Art 76 need not necessarily defend that view also in respect of capital gains, 
which Art 73 precludes from the exemption of Art 11 (d) and which are again considered 
taxable, because it is even more difficult to attribute the Company's underlying corporate tax 
to the capital gains: Capital gains need not exclusively represent the amount of profits 
generated but not yet distributed by the company. The appreciation of the share earned by 
way of capital gains may also be based on assumed future expected yields, reflect general 
market developments or be marked by subjective ideas of buyer and seller. In any event, if 
profits are distributed to the new shareholder after the sale, the company's corporate tax would 
again be credited. This being so, an indirect credit of corporate tax should not be acceptable in 
case of sales.  
However, assuming that a majority of arguments speaks against an indirect credit in case of a 
sale, there is indeed doubt whether that form of crediting foreign tax is permissible in case of 
received profit distributions. The wording of the relevant rules does not seem to provide any 
indication for a differentiation between the two cases. Another argument strengthens these 
doubts: Only Art 76 of the proposal can be viewed as a legal basis for an indirect credit; its 
wording is open. A broad interpretation of Art 76 of the proposal risks making its scope of 
application endless. In that case, one would also have to consider crediting the tax of the 
paying company in case of interest and royalties. The authors of the proposal cannot be 
supposed to have intended that consequence. In addition, Art 74 of the proposal simply refers 
to the computation of income of a permanent establishment in the third country, without 
regulating the "translation" of profits from a company in a third country. All this speaks for 
leaving it at a direct credit based on the current proposal and, in case of taxable profit 
distributions or proceeds from the sale of shares, to credit only the tax of the third country 
imposed upon the recipient. The title of Art 76 of the proposal which refers to taxes "at 
source" seems to point into the same direction. The lacking option of an indirect credit 
however is not convincing in terms of legal policy.                 
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3. Controlled foreign companies (CFCs) 
A mere switch-over is not always the only option. In selected situations, the proposal also 
considers it acceptable to look through the entity resident outside the EU. Art 82 of the 
proposal contains such a CFC clause.40 The tax base shall include the non-distributed income 
of an entity resident in a third country where certain conditions are met. The Commission has 
opted for such a rule although certainly not all Member States have adopted CFC rules in their 
national tax systems.41 It has preferably adopted a provision which allows a look-through 
approach only if certain rather strict conditions are met. In any event, it specifically exempts 
companies, whose principal class of shares is regularly traded on one or more recognized 
stock exchanges. Furthermore, pursuant to Art 82 (2) of the proposal, companies resident in 
an EEA state with which there is an agreement on the exchange of information under 
international law are exempt as well. 
The rule is applicable to entities "resident in a third country". There is no separate definition 
of what resident is supposed to mean. According to their very wording, the provisions of Art 6 
(2) and (3) of the proposal are not applicable, because they govern only the residency of 
companies, but not that of entities. The fact that Art 6 (3) and (4) do not only simply refer to 
companies but state that the criteria laid down in Art 6 (3) are relevant "for purposes of 
paragraphs 1 and 2" suggests that an analogous application of these rules is impossible.   
Furthermore, an application of Art 82 of the proposal requires that the taxpayer "by itself, or 
together with its associated enterprises, holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 
50% of the voting rights" or "owns more than 50% of the capital" or "is entitled to receive 
more than 50% of the profits of that entity". There must hence be a participation of more than 
half of the voting rights, of the capital, or of the profits of the enterprise. At least in respect of 
voting rights, an indirect participation is sufficient. Furthermore, the rule applies also if the 
                                                            
40 For CFC rules in the CCCTB system, see Kofler, CFC Rules, in Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer (eds), Common 
Consolidated Tax Base (2008), 725 (725 et seq). 
41 Haslinger, National Report Austria, in Lang/Aigner/Scheuerle/Stefaner (eds), CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law (2004) 73 (75); von Frenckell, National Report Belgium, in Lang/Aigner/Scheuerle/Stefaner (eds), CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law (2004) 97 (99); Dado/Sedmihradsky, National Report Czech Republic, in 
Lang/Aigner/Scheuerle/Stefaner (eds), CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law (2004) 125 (127); Matsos, 
National Report Greece, in Lang/Aigner/Scheuerle/Stefaner (eds), CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law 
(2004) 281 (283); Noguera/Steichen, National Report Luxembourg, in Lang/Aigner/Scheuerle/Stefaner (eds), 
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compare&format=ghtml&WT.z_nav=search&collection=kf&files=kf_bg,kf_cy,kf_ie,kf_lv,kf_mt,kf_pl,kf_ro,kf
_sk,kf_si (access on 23 March 2012) Belgium. 
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taxpayer fulfills this requirement only "together with its associated enterprises". 
Consequently, however, there can be more than one taxpayer who can hold "by itself, or 
together with its associated enterprises, [...] a direct or indirect participation of more than 
50% of the voting rights" of the foreign entity. That brings us to the following question: To 
which of these enterprises will the CFC rule apply? According to its wording, several 
enterprises subject to the CCCTB regime could have to apply Art 83 of the proposal in respect 
of the same foreign entity. Art 83 (2) of the proposal clarifies however that "income to be 
included in the tax base shall be calculated in proportion to the entitlement of the taxpayer to 
share in the profits of the foreign entity". 
Alongside the switch-over clause in Art 73 of the proposal, the CFC rule applies only if under 
the general regime of the third country profits are subject to corporate tax at a statutory rate of 
less than 40% of the average statutory rate of corporate tax applicable in the Member State or 
if the entity can rely on a special regime which allows for a substantially lower level of 
taxation than the general regime. Accordingly, the look-through approach shall apply only if, 
in the third country, there is a low rate of taxation either under the general regime or 
specifically in respect of the enterprise. Consequently, Art 82 can also be relevant if the lower 
rate of corporate taxation is subject to a high rate of effective corporate taxation by virtue of a 
different tax base in the third country.42 
Furthermore, more than 30% of the entity's income must fall under one or several of the 
categories referred to in paragraph 3. Those categories are interest or any other income 
generated by financial assets (paragraph 3 (a)), royalties or any other income generated by 
intellectual property (paragraph 3 (b)), dividends and income from the disposal of shares 
(paragraph 3 (c)), income from movable property (paragraph 3 (d)), income from immovable 
property – unless the Member State of the taxpayer would not have been entitled to tax the 
income under an agreement concluded with a third country (paragraph 3 (e)) – and income 
from insurance, banking and other financial activities (paragraph 3 (f)). The provision of 
Art 82 (1) (c) initially creates the impression that it is irrelevant whether the above income is 
attributable to only one or to several of those categories. The crucial aspect under Art 82 (1) 
(c) is that more than 30% of the income accruing to the entity falls "within one or more of the 
categories set out in paragraph 3". Eventually, however, the introductory sentence of 
Art 82 (3) clearly shows that the category is decisive: "The following categories of income 
shall be taken into account for the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1, in so far as more 
                                                            
42 CCCTB Working Group, Anti-abuse rules, 26 March 2008, CCCTB/WP/065/, Sections 26 et seq. 
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than 50% of the category of the entity's income comes from transactions with the taxpayer or 
its associated enterprises." A single form of income or – as referred to in Art 82 (1) (c) – 
"category" is taken into account for the purpose of computing the 30% threshold only if more 
than 50% of the category of the entity's income comes from transactions with the taxpayer or 
its associated enterprises. Every category of income shall apparently be taken into account 
separately. 
Example: A company resident in a low-tax country derives 60% of its profits from trading 
goods of any kind with independent third parties, and 20% each from interest and royalties. 
40% of interest and 80% of royalties come from transactions with the shareholder. In that 
case, Art 82 is not applicable, since only royalties are harmful income, but these represent 
only 20% of total profits. However, if 60% of interest and 60% of royalties come from 
transactions with the shareholder, Art 82 will be applicable to the entire profit, because 
interest and royalties are then considered harmful and together represent 40% and hence more 
than 30%.  
It is difficult to see the meaning behind this regime. The differentiation by "categories of 
income" or "categories" seems to produce arbitrary results. Similarly, it is not understandable 
why income from immovable property (Art 82 (3) (e)) should exclusively be exempt if the 
Member State of the taxpayer would not have been entitled to tax the income under an 
agreement concluded with a third country. Admittedly, the state of residence can lose the right 
to tax according to the OECD-MC, yet there are numerous bilateral DTCs which also exempt 
certain categories of interest in the state of residence.43 There is no reason why different rules 
should apply here.  
The consequences of an application of Art 82 are governed in Art 83 of the proposal, which 
provides that income to be included in the tax base shall be calculated according to the rules 
of Articles 9 to 15. Thus, rather than directly relying upon the tax base of the company in the 
third country, the tax base is recalculated, obviously based on the assumption that companies 
in third countries are resident in the EU. As a result, dividends or proceeds from a disposal of 
shares must be exempt pursuant to Art 11 of the proposal. The same is true for proceeds from 
a disposal of shares derived from the third country or another third country. Similarly, the 
income of a permanent establishment in a third country shall not be included in the tax base. 
Art 11 itself does not distinguish whether or not the income is then taxed in that other third 
                                                            
43 Lang, Überlegungen zur österreichischen DBA-Politik, SWI 2012, 108 (111 et seq). 
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country. However, if the company is actually resident in the EU, Art 73 orders an exception 
from the exemptions provided under Art 11 (c), (d) and (e). According to its spirit, the 
exception laid down in Art 73, as such triggering a switch-over, should also be applicable in 
these situations. Yet it is not applicable according to its wording, because Art 83 (1) simply 
refers to Articles 9 to 15 of the proposal. That provision differs from the last sentence of Art 
84 (1), which is applicable to transparent entities and provides that "the income shall be 
computed under the rules of this Directive", and it also differs from Art 74, which provides 
that the "revenues, expenses and other deductible items" of a permanent establishment in a 
third country "shall be determined according to the rules of the system provided for by this 
Directive". 
Let me give you an example: A company subject to the CCCTB regime holds a 100% 
participation in a company resident in the low-tax country A. That company exclusively 
derives income from dividends which come from a participation in a low-tax country B. The 
company resident in B generates its profits from interest earned from loans granted to other 
group companies and is taxed at a rate of only 5% on those profits. Provided that Art 82 is 
applicable to the company resident in A, the income shall be calculated pursuant to Articles 9 
to 15. The dividends from B would have to be exempt, which is why the CFC rule would 
eventually not apply. However, if Art 73 is applied in addition, the dividends must be 
included in the tax base and the CFC rule becomes effective.      
The legal consequence of Art 83 of the proposal does not consist in a full "look-through 
approach". Pursuant to the second sentence of Art 83, losses of the foreign entity shall not be 
included in the tax base, but shall be carried forward and taken into account when applying 
Art 82 in subsequent years.44 
Art 83 of the proposal prevents economic double taxation if the foreign entity distributes 
profits in subsequent years or if its shares are disposed of in subsequent years. Accordingly, 
the income previously included in the tax base pursuant to Art 82 is deducted again when the 
entity's profits are distributed or its shares disposed of. Art 83 (4) and (5) apparently 
presupposes that the otherwise relevant exemption of Art 11 (c) and (d) does not apply, 
because the application of Art 82 also triggers a switch-over pursuant to Art 73. 
 
                                                            
44 On the treatment of losses in the CCCTB system, see Moreno González/Sanz Díaz-Palacios, The Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, Treatment of Losses, in Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer (eds), Common 
Consolidated Tax Base (2008) 441 (441 et seq). 
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IV. Transparent entities 
1. Qualification of entities in third countries 
The proposal contains also rules on transparent entities.45 Where an entity is treated as 
transparent, a taxpayer holding an interest in the entity shall include its share in the income of 
the entity in its tax base. For the purpose of this calculation, the income shall be computed 
under the rules of this Directive. Transactions between a taxpayer and the entity shall be 
disregarded in proportion to the taxpayer's share of the entity. There are no regulations on the 
criteria to be relied upon for the computation of the taxpayer's share, such as those for 
controlled foreign companies.  
Pursuant to Art 84 (1), for entities resident in a Member State, the relevant criterion is their 
treatment in that Member State. If the entity is treated as transparent in the Member State of 
its location, the shareholder's state of residence must also adopt that qualification. This Article 
does not define any criteria to determine residency. An analogous application of Art 6 (3) of 
the proposal is problematic for the reasons discussed above, as these provisions refer only to 
companies and are specifically relevant only for the purposes of the paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Pursuant to Art 85 of the proposal, transparency in the case of third country entities is 
determined in a diametrically opposed form, based on the "law of the Member State of the 
taxpayer". "If at least two group members hold an interest in the same entity located in a third 
country, the treatment of the latter shall be determined by common agreement among the 
relevant Member States. If there is no agreement, the principal tax authority shall decide." 
Art 85 of the proposal does not provide for independent legal consequences in case of shares 
in third country entities. These can be inferred from Art 84 of the proposal. The income of the 
transparent entity is considered to be a proportion of the shareholder's tax base. Pursuant to 
Art 84 (3) of the proposal, the taxpayer shall be entitled to relief for double taxation in 
accordance with Art 76 (1), (2), (3) and (5). Again, the question arises whether an indirect 
credit is acceptable as well. If the third country entity is not treated as transparent there, the 
tax will be imposed for the account of a taxpayer other than the legal entity that is taxable 
under the law of the Member State. Even if an indirect credit is not regarded as acceptable on 
the basis of Art 76, the situation might be different here: The provisions of Art 84 (3) of the 
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proposal could suggest such an understanding: Art 84 (3) would lose its meaning otherwise, 
as the general obligation to credit third country taxes already arises from Art 76 anyway. In 
the context of Art 84, the reference to Art 76 could suggest an indirect credit. 
If the entity which is treated as transparent has a permanent establishment in the third country 
which fulfills the requirements laid down in Art 5, the entity's assumed transparency will lead 
to the permanent establishment being regarded proportionally as that of the taxpayer. 
Consequently, the exemption of Art 11 (e) of the proposal applies and the income must be 
disregarded for the purpose of calculating the tax base. If a third country entity is qualified as 
non-transparent, received profit distributions are exempt pursuant to Art 11 (c) and proceeds 
from a disposal of shares are exempt pursuant to Art 11 (d). Against that backdrop, it makes 
little difference whether a third country entity is treated as transparent, as the profits generated 
there and from that entity are obviously exempt anyway. However, if the third country entity 
is treated as transparent, it is exempt within the EU if it has a permanent establishment in the 
third country and if the profits can be attributed to it. In other words, if the third country entity 
is a corporation established under the laws of that country, which derives only interest and 
does not have its own permanent establishment, Art 85 of the proposal will subject to tax the 
interest received by the third country entity at the level of its shareholders in the EU. If 
indirect credit is considered unacceptable, this situation may even give rise to double taxation, 
because the same interest is attributable to the company located in the third country according 
to the law of that third country and, according to the proposal, to the shareholder in the EU.  
In a mirroring case, however, even double non-taxation may occur: If the third country entity 
without a permanent establishment is treated as transparent in its state of establishment, 
interest it receives might not be taxed at all in that state. However, if it is not regarded as 
transparent pursuant to Art 85 of the proposal, income will not be attributed to the EU-
resident shareholder for the purpose of the Directive and any subsequent transfer of the third 
country entity's profits is then qualified as received profit distribution and is exempt pursuant 
to Art 11 (c) of the proposal. A tax liability could at best be inferred from Art 73 of the 
proposal if the profits are not taxed in the third country, for example because there is no 
permanent establishment. Then again, the application of Art 73 is opposed by the fact that the 
tax exemption is the result of its treatment as transparent rather than the consequence of a low 
rate of taxation. If that consequence arises from the tax system as a whole, there will be no 
"special regime" which could also trigger the application of Art 73.       
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A "dividend" paid by the third-country entity to the EU shareholder cannot be taxed. In case 
of transparent entities, it is more difficult to derive that tax exemption from Art 11 (c) of the 
proposal, because a look-through approach is applied to the "distributing" entity pursuant to 
Art 84 (f). Consequently, the "distributing" entity cannot be identified easily. However, to 
assume a tax liability would be inconsistent with the purpose of the rule, as it lies in the very 
nature of transparency to immediately tax the company's profits without having to wait for 
their transfer to the shareholder. As a consequence, the lack of taxability of profits transferred 
to the shareholder can obviously be derived from the system laid down in Art 84 (f). 
 
2. EU permanent establishments of third-country entities and transparency  
In any event, the criteria which may be relied upon pursuant to Art 85 of the proposal for third 
country entities differ from those which are relevant pursuant to Art 2 (2) for the companies 
established according to the law of a third country. Pursuant to Art 85, the only criterion is the 
qualification according to the national law of the shareholder's state of residence in the EU. 
Pursuant to Art 2 (2), it is decisive whether the company "has a similar form to one of the 
forms listed in Annex I". In reliance on the opinion discussed above, the different forms must 
be compared and the major features of all forms listed in Annex I must be identified. Even if 
the focus is merely put on a similarity with those forms which are listed in Annex I for the 
relevant state of the permanent establishment, the criteria need not be the same as those which 
apply according to the national laws of that state for the purpose of classifying foreign 
companies for purposes of corporate tax. Difficult interpretation problems and even 
distortions may arise from the differences between Art 85 and Art 2 (2) of the proposal.46 
Let me give you an example: A company resident in EU Member State A holds a 50% share 
in a subsidiary in a third country which does not have a permanent establishment in that 
country. The third country entity has a permanent establishment in EU Member State B. The 
third country regards the company resident in that state as taxpayer while it is treated as 
transparent according to the national tax law of state A. If state B applies the examination 
procedure required in Art 2 (2) of the proposal in respect of the permanent establishment 
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located in its territory, the entity of the third country qualifies as "company" according to the 
proposal.   
In this event, the subsidiary's income shall be included proportionally into the tax base of the 
company which is resident in A pursuant to Art 85. The same is true for the profits 
attributable to the third country's permanent establishment in the EU. After all, the permanent 
establishment is no independent enterprise and can hence not be qualified pursuant to Art 84. 
The permanent establishment's income cannot be exempt, since Art 11 (e) applies only to 
permanent establishments in a third country. The third country entity itself, however, is 
regarded as taxpayer in Member State B. Pursuant to Art 6 (2) of the proposal, it may opt for 
the application of the rules of the Directive for its EU permanent establishment. In that case, a 
group cannot be formed with the company resident in A, because the share amounts to only 
and not more than 50%. As a consequence, the profits attributable to the permanent 
establishment located in state B must be recognized both at the level of the company resident 
in A and also at the level of the third country entity itself and are hence taxable in state B 
where the permanent establishment is located. In this case, the application of the Directive 
leads to double taxation in the EU. The tax imposed in B can at best be credited in A if the 
reference in Art 84 (3) to Art 76 of the proposal is interpreted as to allow also an indirect 
credit.   
    
3. Controlled foreign companies and transparency 
Another question is the relationship between the rules in Art 84 (f) on transparent entities and 
those in Art 82 (f) on controlled foreign companies. This question seems unimportant at least 
at first sight: Both sets of rules pierce the corporate veil in that the profits of the third country 
entity are proportionally attributed to the shareholder's profits. The legal consequences hence 
seem to be the same. That result is however called to question if we consider the profits 
subsequently transferred to the shareholder: As discussed, such payments are not taxable at 
the level of the shareholder if the third country entity is treated as transparent pursuant to Art 
85. However, distributions are taxable if the CFC rules of Art 82 (f) are applicable: Due to the 
exception laid down in Art 73, the exemption of Art 11 (c) of the proposal does not apply. 
Art 83 (4) of the proposal indirectly confirms that tax liability, stipulating that the amounts of 
income previously included in the tax base shall be deducted from the tax base.  
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In this case, there is evidence to support the supposition that the CFC rule is not relevant, 
because it can be found in Chapter XIV of the proposal which, by its title, deals with "Anti-
abuse rules". If a general rule such as that on transparent entities regulates the attribution of 
income to the EU shareholder, there is no necessity to bring the anti-abuse rules into play.      
   
V. Double taxation conventions (DTCs) 
1. Priority of DTCs with third countries 
The relationship between the Directive and the DTCs is complex.47 There is a tight network of 
DTCs between the EU Member States and between Member States and third countries. The 
provisions of Union law take precedence over DTCs in the relations between the Member 
States. Although already emanating from primary law,48 that principle is repeated in Art 8 of 
the CCCTB proposal: "The provisions of this Directive shall apply notwithstanding any 
provision to the contrary in any agreement concluded between Member States." Still, the 
DTCs do not entirely lose their meaning in the scope of application of this Directive. Treaty 
law takes precedence only if the DTC rules are opposed to a regulation of the Directive. 
Within the EU, this is certainly not always the case. For example, Art 76 of the proposal 
regulates the credit of those taxes which were already paid in another Member State or even 
in a third country. Accordingly, subject to Art 76, withholding taxes imposed on interest, 
royalties and any other income taxed at source in a Member State or in a third country may be 
credited in the taxpayer's state of residence. That credit is not available if a DTC exists 
between the state of residence and the other Member State which prevents the other Member 
State from imposing withholding tax. Accordingly, the DTC continues to be applicable after 
all. 
                                                            
47 CCCTB Working Group, International aspects in the CCCTB, 18 November 2005, CCCTB/WP/019/, Sections 17 
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The CCCTB proposal does not contain general rules in respect of third countries. Art 351 
TFEU stipulates that the rights and obligations from agreements concluded before 1 January 
1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between Member States and 
third countries shall not be affected by this Treaty. To the extent that such agreements are not 
compatible with the Treaty, the Member States shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities. This can even necessitate the termination of the international treaty.49 Based 
on an a contrario reasoning, however, later treaties that are incompatible with Union law 
must even be disregarded and Union law will therefore have precedence in any event.50 
According to the – albeit controversial51 – opinion of Advocate General Kokott, an analogous 
application of Art 351 (1) TFEU52 is conceivable "where an international obligation on the 
part of a Member State conflicts with a subsequently agreed measure of secondary law".53 
This can mean that the currently applicable DTCs with third countries are still applicable and 
will take precedence over the Directive until the change or termination of the DTC. 
However, Art 351 TFEU regulates only conflicts between DTCs and the Directive. Such a 
conflict does not exist if a DTC allows dividends to be credited and if those dividends must be 
exempt under the Directive. An exemption within the EU is not incompatible with the DTC as 
the latter does not impose a liability to tax. In that event, the credit may eventually be 
meaningless, if the maximum amount of credit under the DTC is zero. 
There is, however, a conflict between a DTC and the Directive if a DTC - in derogation to the 
OECD-MC – stipulates an exemption of interest in the state of residence, while Art 6 (6) and 
Art 76 of the CCCTB proposal subject that interest to tax. In such a case, the DTC exemption 
has priority within the scope of application of Art 351 TFEU - possibly extended by way of 
analogy. Similarly, if the DTC exempts income from a permanent establishment in the third 
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country and a permanent establishment for purposes of treaty law has already existed for six 
months in case of construction projects, a conflict exists which must be resolved in favour of 
the DTC. The same applies if a DTC between a Member State and a third country qualifies a 
construction project to be a permanent establishment only if it has existed more than eighteen 
months and a non-resident needs 15 months for a construction projection in an EU state: 
According to the Directive, the company resident in the third country could already opt for the 
CCCTB system in respect of its permanent establishment, while the DTC prevents that state's 
taxation right, so that the Directive will prevail subject to Art 351 TFEU. 
Finally, some Articles of the CCCTB proposal directly address DTC rules. For example, 
Art 76 (5) of the proposal stipulates that the creditable third country tax may not exceed the 
final corporate tax liability of a taxpayer "unless an agreement concluded between the 
Member State of its residence and a third country states otherwise". That provision 
apparently has in mind the obligation to refund a withholding tax imposed by a third country, 
similar to what the ECJ had in mind in the Case Amurta54. Such rules must certainly be borne 
in mind even if they are included in a later DTC. Similarly, there is no obligation to amend 
those DTCs as would otherwise be necessary pursuant to Art 351 (2) TFEU. 
 
2. DTCs and foreign controlled companies 
Against that backdrop, we now need to answer the question whether DTCs preclude the 
application of the CFC rules. Art 82 of the CCCTB proposal addresses bilateral agreements 
twice: Pursuant to Art 82 (2) of the proposal, paragraph 1 shall not apply where the third 
country is party to the European Economic Area and "there is an agreement on the exchange 
of information comparable to the exchange of information on request provided for in 
Directive 2011/16/EU".55 Art 82 (3) lists as one of the categories of potentially harmful 
income also income from immovable property "unless the Member State of the taxpayer 
would not have been entitled to tax the income under an agreement concluded [with a third 
country]". Still, both regulations do not provide any indication to generally clarify the 
relationship between Art 82 (f) and the DTCs. 
                                                            
54 ECJ 8 November 2007, Case C-379/05, Amurta. 
55 Matthijs Vogel, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (`CCCTB`); 
comments by Peter Adriaansen, Hans Bakker, Imme Kam, Thies Sanders, Paul Simonis, Matthijs Vogel, 
Jochem van der Wal and Dennis Weber in Highlights & Insights on European Taxation 2011, 5 (59). 
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DTC rules which - possibly by way of analogy - fall within the ambit of Art 351 TFEU can 
preclude the application of Art 82 (f) only if the provisions of the Directive are incompatible 
with them. The decisive question is whether there is such a conflict. Courts that had to address 
the relationship between national CFC rules and DTCs have given completely different 
answers to that question. Let me give you two examples: The Finnish Supreme Court held the 
application of the Finnish CFC rule compatible with the DTC56. The judgment was primarily 
based on the objective and purpose of the DTC and the OECD Commentary. The French 
Conseil d’Etat adopted an entirely different opinion in its judgment of 28 June 2002 which 
concerned Schneider SA57: The 1966 DTC between France and Switzerland, modified in 1969 
and modelled after Art 7 (1) OECD-MC requires the exemption of income which may be 
taxed in Switzerland pursuant to Art 7 (1) of the DTC, because the Swiss subsidiary has its 
place of management in Switzerland and does not have a permanent establishment in France. 
The Court held that the goal of preventing double taxation did not allow any other 
interpretation of the treaty rules. 
It is unproductive for a solution to rely on the objective of the DTCs alone.58 Although DTCs 
shall prevent double taxation, they shall do so only within their scope of application.59 As a 
result of CFC rules, the two states will attribute the income to different persons, and the DTCs 
usually do not focus on ensuring protection against such economic double taxation.60 The 
Commentary does not offer a solution either: It is the treaty rule which is decisive, and its 
content must be interpreted in reliance on the Commentary. Based on an appropriate view, 
however, that applies only if the version of the Commentary which addresses the issue had 
already been available when the relevant DTC was concluded.61  
In case of those DTCs which are modelled after the OECD Model, Art 7 is one possible 
distributive rule. Pursuant to Art 7 OECD MC, the profits of an enterprise of a Contracting 
                                                            
56 A Oyi Abp, 20 March 2002, KHO 596/2002/26, 4 International Tax Law Reports 2002, 1009; see also Marjaana 
Helminen, National Report Finland in Lang et al., CFC regulations, Tax Treaties and EC Law, Kluwer Law vol 8 
2004, 191 (204 et seq). 
57 Societé Schneider Electric, 28 June 2002, Conseil d’Etat No. 232276, 4 International Tax Law Reports 2002, 
1077; see also Douvier/Bouzoraa, France: Court of Appeal Confirms Incompatibility of CFC Rules with Tax 
Treaties, European Taxation 2001, 184 (184 et seq).  
58 Lang, Die Besteuerung von Einkünften bei unterschiedlichen Personen aus dem Blickwinkel des DBA-Rechts, 
SWI 2000, 527 (527 et seq) 
59 Lang, SWI 2000, 533 et seq. 
60 OECD-MC Commentary, Art 23A and B, §2. 
61 Supreme Administrative Court 31 July 1996, 92/13/0172, 21 May 1997, 96/14/0084; see also Lang, Das 
OECD-Musterabkommen 2001 und darüber hinaus: welche Bedeutung haben die nach Abschluss eines 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommens erfolgten Änderungen des OECD-Kommentars? Internationales 
Steuerrecht, 2001, 538; see also Avery Jones, The Effect of Changes in the OECD Commentaries after a 
Treaty is Concluded, 56 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 3 2002, 102. 
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State shall be taxable only in that State, unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein and the profits are 
attributable to that permanent establishment. The state of residence does not have a right to 
tax if those profits must be exempt under the method of taxation rules. In the case of such a 
foreign controlled company the profits which are attributable to the EU company, the DTC 
can achieve that effect only if the attribution of profits, for purposes of treaty law, also leads 
to its qualification as a permanent establishment of the EU company. It is, however, highly 
doubtful whether that attribution, decided on national level, could also impact Art 7 OECD 
MC.62 Art 7 OECD-MC is however applicable only if Art 10 OECD-MC does not apply, as 
the latter has priority pursuant to the rules of subsidiarity of treaty law. If the participation in 
such an entity represents a share in a company, I believe that the requirements for an 
application of Art 10 OECD-MC are fulfilled, as the share is causal for the tax liability 
pursuant to Art 82 (f).63 This applies not only to the distribution of profits, but also to the 
profit itself. The application of Art 10 OECD-MC is occasionally doubtful, for example 
because there is no payment.64 In my opinion, however, the term "pay" must not be construed 
so restrictively and covers any event which triggers a tax liability within the scope of Art 10 
OECD-MC.65 Whoever considers Art 10 OECD-MC applicable will conclude that the EU 
Member State is not prevented from applying Art 82 (f). 
3. DTCs and transparency 
The same considerations could apply in respect of participations in those companies which are 
qualified as taxpayers in the third country, while being treated as transparent in the EU 
Member State in which the shareholder is resident. Foreign controlled companies are only one 
special case of those scenarios. These cases must hence be treated equally for purposes of 
treaty law. The fact that the title of Chapter XIV which concerns foreign controlled companies 
is "Anti-abuse rules" does not change anything. Consequently, there is strong evidence that 
those profits can be recognized in the Member State pursuant to Art 84 (f), either pursuant to 
Art 10 OECD MC or pursuant to Art 7 OECD-MC, if the third country entity's permanent 
establishment is not regarded as permanent establishment of the shareholder. 
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Distributions undoubtedly fall under Art 10 OECD-MC. The fact that they are exempt in the 
Member State under Art 11 (c) of the proposal should not prevent the third country from 
applying the DTC and the limitation of withholding tax as provided therein. Treaty benefits 
may be claimed despite the fact that proceeds from shares are exempt. However, the last 
sentence of Art 76 (1) of the proposal prevents a credit of the remaining withholding tax 
which is lawfully imposed.      
 
VI. Conclusion and legal outlook 
The proposal represents an impressive legal achievement. Its authors were able to propose 
provisions, which largely make the principles of the proposal a reality in a convincing 
manner. Still, especially those of the proposal's rules which are relevant for third country 
scenarios give rise to difficult questions of interpretation. Given the complexity of the matter, 
these or other instances of doubts would presumably arise even if the authors had chosen 
another method of regulating it.  
Besides detailed suggestions, the following legal improvements could be made to the 
proposal: 
- When regulating certain questions, the authors of the OECD MC and of some other 
Directives - such as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalties 
Directive - encountered similar challenges. Having recognized this, the authors of the 
proposal have followed those rules in many respects. That makes sense, as it would be 
a waste of resources to re-invent the wheel. Incorporating existing provisions by 
reference rather allows practitioners to rely upon scholarly legal writing and case law 
issued in respect of existing legislation. The fact that the provisions of the proposal 
largely, but not entirely, follow those models affects that advantage and gives rise to 
many an interpretation difficulty. The editors of the proposal are called upon to opt for 
and - if the factual context suggests - to fully build each provision on a certain model. 
- Certain provisions of the proposal unnecessarily build on the national laws of the 
Member States, such as for example, the transparency rules, which are determined by 
the national law of the shareholder's Member State. In some partial areas, this 
approach thwarts the objective of the Directive, which is to create a common tax base, 
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and makes its application more difficult. The Directive's provisions should be 
autonomous whenever possible without having to refer to the national law. 
- The transparency rules are one example that the Directive regulates the same question 
- namely how to classify foreign entities for the purpose of the Directive - in a 
different manner. Many a problem of interpretation could be avoided if those 
questions were resolved according to uniform criteria.    
  
